

Brief for the Offense

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Without Cloak or Dagger

By Miles Copeland

Simon & Schuster, 351 pp., \$8.95

Apprentice authors of spy stories will find Miles Copeland's new book a sound investment, tax deductible as a training expense, and even old hands could probably pick up a few pointers. As bonus, Appendix C gives you a do-it-yourself double-talk code; Appendix D, a sample system for arranging covert meetings; and Appendix E, a "one-time pad" code that Copeland guarantees to be unbreakable, Edgar Allan Poe notwithstanding.

In one capacity or another, Miles Copeland has been in or near the "intelligence community" since OSS days, and he draws amply and engagingly from firsthand knowledge. To explain what sort of people become "spies" (agents), for example, he doesn't rely on psychological abstractions but tells us the stories of four Americans whose careers as Soviet agents have been used as case histories in CIA training courses. There is "Emily," an attractive but shy lady who, one spring evening in 1950, met a kindly, handsome man of about forty whom we may call 'Foster.' Emily was personal assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State. . . . Foster didn't want anything, not even sex, and he took no interest whatever in Emily's job. He seemed genuinely to enjoy Emily's company, and he knew all sorts of cozy little restaurants. . . . Foster, an officer of the USSR's secret intelligence service, was putting Emily through what is known . . . as 'prerecruitment development.' The second type is "the 'Mickey'—the 'walk-in' spy who, because of special knowledge and experience was able to get in touch with a foreign intelligence service . . . without being spotted." Then the "Philby" (this type name taken from the British example)—"the long-term agent, recruited in his youth," and finally, "the 'Willie'—the spy who is actually working for one intelligence service but who, for at least part of his career, is led by his 'principal' to believe he is working for another."

Enriched and enlivened with such seasoning of specifics, Copeland's easy, readable prose introduces us to the intricacies of espionage and counterespionage, "residents" and their "stations," sneakies and screechies, drops and "special projects," their intelligence ap-

paratus and ours. We become acquainted with CIA's most hidden cadres, such as the jovial Mother, Kingfish, the Fisherman, Jojo, and Lady Windermere. It is Mother who organized the Octopus system for the counterterrorist operation that he runs, and we sit with Mother in his office at Langley headquarters that "is fitted out as a spacious hunting lodge, with beams crossing a slanting ceiling . . . and a well stocked bar."

Copeland, however, is not out merely to inform and entertain us. "As I see the flood of misinformation on spies and counterspies that is passed out to the public . . . I become strongly tempted to tell all I know on this subject which has occupied most of my working life. . . . My knowledge of the business is from the inside, and it has been sufficiently across-the-board to keep me from making the mistakes of those disgruntled CIA specialists who left the Agency to write exposés." The last phrase indicates what seems to be the primary, if implicit, purpose of *Without Cloak or Dagger*: to defend CIA against those exposés that have been given so active a play in the last few years by book publishers and the media.

In short, Copeland has written an informal brief for the CIA. If I were a cynical type I might wonder whether his book is a working instance of a CIA covert (black or maybe grey) operation of the kind he describes.

Copeland does not state his case systematically, but it may be summarized as follows: 1) We live in a global situation that includes a) nuclear weapons that are a continuous and total threat to our security; b) a number of nations, principally the Communist nations, or "Bloc" in Copeland's usual phrase, that are basically hostile and are actively implementing their hostility by many kinds of clandestine, subversive, and revolutionary as well as conventional means; and c) powerful, growing, and ruthless terrorist groups operating across as well as within national boundaries. 2) Conventional police and military methods are inadequate for defense under these given conditions. 3) We must have a further defense mechanism able to use unconventional and when necessary clandestine means to get the information we require about what is going on and to carry out special types of counteraction. 4) Therefore the CIA is necessary and justified.

I find the three premises convincing. I am afraid, however, that Copeland does not quite make the jump to the conclusion in a manner sufficient to answer all the allegations made by the disgruntled. To say that a central intelligence agency, or something of the sort, is necessary and justified—which does follow from the premises—is not the same thing as to say, as Copeland does, that our present CIA is in all respects just what the doctor ordered. He overstates his case, really. He does not make a single criticism of the Agency, its personnel, or any of its operations. "Through all the Agency's